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THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
THEORY IN OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER 
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
Stefan J. Padfield1 
ABSTRACT 
In her article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, 
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Joan Heminway notes that 
efforts to guide the decision-making of corporate directors away from shareholder 
wealth maximization are suspect, whether by way of charter, bylaw, shareholder 
agreement, or board policy. This is because when board decision-making serves the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, or pursues corporate objectives with no 
shareholder wealth benefits, directors run the risk of violating positive law or public 
policy that prioritizes shareholder wealth maximization.  Meanwhile, in his article, 
The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, Professor Eric Chaffee presents what 
he calls a new “essentialist” theory of the corporation, which he labels “collaboration 
theory.” According to Professor Chaffee, this new theory explains why corporations 
have a duty to act in socially responsible ways, except when to do so would obviously 
destroy shareholder value. 
In this Essay, I build on the aforementioned work of Professors Heminway and 
Chaffee in order to analyze to what extent corporate personality theory, including 
Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory, has a role to play in determining the extent to 
which for-profit corporations may use private ordering to limit the constraints of any 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.  Professor Heminway argues that there exists 
uncertainty about the ability of corporate stakeholders to use private ordering in this 
way, and the validity and enforceability of related bylaws, shareholder agreements, and 
board policies is therefore in doubt. At the same time, courts and legislatures often rely 
on theory and policy to resolve the existing uncertainty, and thus theory and policy may 
                                                            
1 Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  Thanks to Eric Chaffee, Joan 
Heminway, Haskell Murray, and Robert Rhee for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper.  A draft of this paper was presented at “Business Law: Connecting the 
Threads,” a CLE conference at the University of Tennessee College of Law on 
September 15, 2017.  My thanks also to all the participants at, and organizers of, that 
conference, especially Eric Franklin Amarante and Kelsey Cunningham Osborne.  
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be decisive.  In this Essay, I hope to show that corporate personality theory can be one 
of the relevant theoretical tools that may be used to bring additional  
clarity to this area. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Corporate governance can be understood as encompassing the 
theories, norms, and rules that determine (1) who decides how scarce 
corporate resources will be allocated, and (2) what the goal of that 
decision-making should be.  Three of the most dominant theories of 
corporate governance are director primacy, shareholder primacy, and 
team production theory.2  Director primacy is generally understood to 
argue that the board of directors is the ultimate decision-maker, and that 
the goal of the board’s decision-making should be shareholder wealth 
maximization.3  Meanwhile, shareholder primacy also (unsurprisingly) 
favors shareholder wealth maximization as the goal, but argues that 
shareholders should have more decision-making power than they 
currently do.4  Finally, team production theory aligns with director 
primacy in locating decision-making power in the board, but conceives 
of the goal as mediating the often conflicting interests of the various 
corporate stakeholders in order to allow the corporation to optimally 
fulfill its various obligations in an arguably sustainable way.5 
 While two of these three dominant theories of corporate 
governance identify shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of 
                                                            
2 See Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015) (discussing “three competing models of corporate governance: 
director primacy, shareholder primacy, and team production”). 
3 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 550 (2003). 
4 See Padfield, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
5 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 257–58 (1999); id. at 249 (“In this Article we take issue with both the 
prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth 
maximization goal that underlies it.”); id. at 253 (“[B]oards exist not to protect 
shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members 
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and 
possibly other groups, such as creditors.”). 
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corporate governance, there is a surprising amount of disagreement 
among corporate governance experts as to the extent to which boards 
are actually subject to a duty to maximize shareholder value.6  In her 
article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional 
Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Joan Heminway reviews the 
possible sources of such a duty,7 and concludes that there is reason to be 
                                                            
6 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, 
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 972 (2017). 
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS 
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 29 
(2012) (denying the existence of a pervasive 
shareholder wealth maximization norm); Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby 
Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2015) (surveying 
academic literature on the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm and concluding that there is none); 
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 389, 393–99 (2014) (describing shareholder 
wealth maximization as a norm of corporate 
governance and an objective of corporate law); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in 
the Convergence Debate, 16 Transnat'l LAW. 45, 45 (2002) 
(describing the shareholder wealth maximization norm 
as “well-established in U.S. corporate law” and treating 
it “as given”). 
Id. at 940 n.3. 
7 In this Essay, I will speak of shareholder wealth maximization as a duty, rule, and 
norm.  For purposes of this Essay, I use these labels interchangeably.  Cf. Heminway, 
supra note 6, at 939 n.1 (2017) (discussing various definitions of “norm”/“norms” 
including “a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or 
legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions,” and “standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations” (first quoting JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008), and 
then quoting Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983))). 
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suspicious about pronouncements that shareholder wealth maximization 
is the dominant corporate governance norm.  Nonetheless, she assumes 
practitioners cannot ignore the evidence in favor of such a norm, and 
proceeds to ask what forms of private ordering may be available to opt 
out of it.  Ultimately, Professor Heminway concludes that even here 
there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty. 
 This Essay builds on Professor Heminway’s article by exploring 
the extent to which corporate personality theory can be used to further 
our understanding both of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in 
general, and the extent to which parties may opt out of it.  Corporate 
personality theory tends to come up more frequently in discussions of 
the government’s ability to regulate corporations, as opposed to 
discussions of the allocation of power among the primary private 
corporate stakeholders, which tends to be more the domain of corporate 
governance.  However, the lines between external regulation of 
corporations and their internal affairs can quickly blur,8 and this Essay 
will argue, among other things, that corporate personality theory has a 
role to play in the corporate governance debates surrounding 
shareholder wealth maximization.   
The three dominant theories of corporate personality are artificial 
entity, aggregate, and real entity theory.9  Generally speaking, artificial 
entity theory views the corporation as a creature of the state, and tends 
to presume the government has more power to regulate corporations 
                                                            
8 See Ann Lipton, Unicorn Governance and Power, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Oct. 14, 2017), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/10/unicorn-governance-and-
power.html (noting that corporate governance obligations “placed on firms ostensibly 
for the protection of investors have very tangible effects on employees, customers, 
competitors, and general compliance with the rule of law” and that it “is not clear that 
external regulation alone can carry this responsibility”). 
9 Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the Death of the 
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 373 (2017) (reviewing theories); Padfield, 
supra note 2, at 20 (“I have sought in my recent scholarship to align the dominant 
theories of corporate governance with the primary theories of corporate personality.”) 
(citing Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory 66 OKLA. L. REV 327, 331 
(2014); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign 
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 835 (2013); Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank 
Corporation: More Than A Nexus-of-Contracts 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 215 (2011)). 
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than either the aggregate or real entity theories, which tend to view the 
corporation as standing more in private shoes – be that by way of the 
shareholders under aggregate theory or the directors under real entity 
theory.10  In his article, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Professor Eric Chaffee presents what he calls “a new essentialist theory 
of the corporation,” which he terms “collaboration theory.”11  According 
to Professor Chaffee, this new theory “explains why the collaborating 
parties have an obligation to manage the corporation in a way that is 
socially responsible.”12  In this Essay, I also will build on Professor 
Chaffee’s article by applying his discussion of corporate personality 
theory—including his collaboration theory—to the issue of corporations 
opting out of shareholder wealth maximization.   
Following this Introduction, Part II will review the evidence for 
and against a shareholder wealth maximization norm, relying heavily on 
Professor Heminway’s Shareholder Wealth Maximization article.  Part III 
will then lay out in more detail the various corporate personality theories, 
this time relying heavily on Professor Chaffee’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility article.  Part IV will then seek to advance the discussion by 
applying the corporate personality lessons to the issue of private ordering 
around the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  Ultimately, I offer 
two conclusions.  First, the corporate personality theories discussed can 
be ranked in terms of their support for private ordering and opting out 
of any shareholder wealth maximization norm,13 and advocates on either 
                                                            
10 But cf. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 
353, 365 (2017) (“The work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke played a key role 
in the development of real entity theory. Gierke posited that groups have a ‘collective 
spirit’ that gives them an identity separate and apart from the individuals composing 
them.”). 
11 Id. at 356. 
12 Id. 
13 One should generally expect that the more a particular theory of corporate 
personality views the corporation as a private rather than a public construct, the more 
freedom that theory should support granting to corporations to opt out of regulatory 
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side of the debate risk ceding precious ground to their opponents if they 
ignore these theories in the course of making their arguments.14  Second, 
collaboration theory, in particular, provides unique support for a 
particular form of at least minimizing the constraints of shareholder 
wealth maximization via private ordering without directly undermining 
shareholder wealth maximization.15  Finally, I will provide concluding 
remarks in Part V. 
                                                                                                                                            
default rules.  Thus, one might rank the theories from most to least supportive of 
private ordering as follows: (1) aggregate theory, (2) real entity theory, (3) collaboration 
theory, and (4) artificial entity theory.  Of course, context matters, and thus, for 
example, collaboration theory might be more supportive of opting out of shareholder 
wealth maximization due to its fundamental support of corporate social responsibility. 
14 Cf. Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign 
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 833 (2013) (“Despite protestations to the 
contrary, . . . a closer reading of the Citizens United opinion reveals that both the 
majority and dissent not only adopted diverging theories of the corporation, but that 
those theories were likely dispositive.”); id. at 857 (“[R]eview of the primary campaign 
finance cases leading up to, and relied upon in, Citizens United should make clear that an 
on-going debate about the nature of corporations has been central to the resolution of 
these cases, despite the fact that none of the opinions have expressly referenced 
corporate theory.”). 
15 Specifically, the following guidelines, which Professor Chaffee argues necessarily flow 
from collaboration theory, may form the basis of charter amendments and bylaws that 
provide the greatest freedom to pursue social ends while not directly conflicting with 
shareholder wealth maximization: 
[B]eyond engaging in socially responsible behavior 
when it supports profit maximization, those 
organizing, operating, and owning corporations 
should engage in such behavior in two additional 
circumstances to fulfill their implied duty of good 
faith. First, in instances in which the socially 
responsible behavior neither financially benefits 
nor financially harms the corporation, which 
means it is cost neutral, the corporation should 
engage in socially responsible behavior to fulfill 
the implied duty of good faith within the 
collaboration. Second, in instances in which the 
financial benefit to the business entity is uncertain, 
the corporation should engage in socially 
responsible behavior to fulfill the implied duty of 
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II. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
 In her article, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of 
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, Professor Heminway tries 
to locate the duty to maximize shareholder value in both statutory law 
and court opinions.  The following two sub-parts A and B will 
summarize her findings, and provide some additional commentary.  Sub-
part C will then review Professor Heminway’s discussion of the 
likelihood that organic documents such as a corporation’s charter or 
bylaws can provide an effective means of opting out of any duty to 
maximize shareholder value. 
A. Statutes 
In Professor Heminway’s survey of the relevant statutory law, 
she found that none expressly codify a duty to maximize shareholder 
value,16 whether in provisions governing the charter’s statement of 
purpose,17 or in provisions setting forth director and officer standards of 
conduct.18  Meanwhile, Professor Heminway identifies statutory 
                                                                                                                                            
good faith within the collaboration. Because the 
future is often uncertain, this means that in many 
instances corporations should engage in the 
socially responsible course of action. 
Chaffee, supra note 10, at 376. 
16 Heminway, supra note 6, at 946. But cf. James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1598 (2013) (“[T]the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles 
of Corporate Governance declares that ‘a corporation . . . should have as its objective 
the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.’”) (quoting 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994)). 
17 Heminway, supra note 6, at 946 (“These state statutory provisions on corporate 
charters, even with their differences, do not mandate or expressly invoke an emphasis 
on shareholder wealth maximization or even shareholder value or primacy.”). 
18 Id. at 947–48 (“These standards prescribe that actions be taken in good faith, with 
due care, and in the best interest of the corporation. Yet, none of these statutory 
frameworks regarding officer and director management or conduct mention—no less 
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provisions that expressly disavow a corporate duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth, such as constituency statutes.19  Of course, the fact 
that legislatures felt it necessary to promulgate such statutes at least 
suggests they assumed a default shareholder wealth maximization norm 
existed.  The same could be said of benefit corporation statutes.20 
B. Decisional Law 
 In the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of 
Michigan famously asserted:  
A business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end. The 
                                                                                                                                            
require—management action in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth or value 
or compels shareholder primacy.”).  But cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy 
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 285 (1998) (“‘[T]he best interests of the corporation’ are 
generally understood to coincide with the best long-term interests of the 
shareholders.”); COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, AM. BAR ASSOC., Other Constituencies Statutes: 
Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2265 (1990) (“[T]he ‘best interests of the 
corporation’ are equated with ‘corporate profit and shareholder gain.”’).  The drafters’ 
intent when using “best interests of the corporation” may thus have been to create a 
default rule in favor of shareholder wealth maximization, while maintaining the 
flexibility to cover subsequent adjustments derived from other sources like constituency 
statutes. 
19 Heminway, supra note 6, at 948 (“[A] significant number of states have adopted ‘other 
constituency’ legislation—statutes that emphasize management's ability to consider the 
effects of corporate action on a variety of stakeholders.”); cf. id. at 949 (“Neither the 
DGCL [Delaware General Corporation Law] nor the MBCA [Model Business 
Corporation Act] includes other constituency provisions.”); Stephen Bainbridge, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Principle Versus Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.professorbain-
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-shareholder-wealth-maximization-
principle-versus-non-shareholder-constituency-statutes.html (“[T]he shareholder wealth 
maximization norm may survive even in states with nonshareholder constituency 
statutes.”). 
20 Heminway, supra note 6, at 949–50 (“One could argue that benefit corporation 
statutes, which typically do not permit the corporation's board to prioritize shareholder 
wealth over other corporate interests, have become popular largely because of concern 
that a shareholder wealth maximization norm does exist . . .”). 
2017]                     THE ROLE OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY                     423 
 
 
discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end, 
and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or 
to the nondistribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes. 21 
 Many years later, in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 
Chancellor Chandler, writing for the Court of Chancery of Delaware, 
applied a similar principle when he held:  
Having chosen a for-profit corporate 
form, the craigslist directors are bound by 
the fiduciary duties and standards that 
accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the 
company name has to mean at least that.22  
 These are two of the cases most often cited as evidence of a 
common law duty to maximize shareholder value.23  According to a 
                                                            
21 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).  It may be worth noting 
here that identifying shareholder profit as the primary purpose of a for-profit 
corporation does not preclude other secondary purposes. 
22 EBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also id. 
(“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate 
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value 
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .”). 
23 Heminway, supra note 6, at 950–51 (“The list of judicial decisions that support 
corporate shareholder wealth maximization is short and has been well trod in the 
literature. Typically, summaries of the court opinions in this area begin with the iconic 
early twentieth-century Michigan case Dodge v. Ford Motor Company and extend through 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, sometimes stopping along the way to note other 
cases, including Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. and its progeny, and 
perhaps another case or two, like Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.”); cf. Robert P. Bartlett, III, 
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Westlaw search on August 12, 2017, Dodge has been cited in seventy-one 
subsequent cases, with only two being characterized as providing a 
“Negative Treatment” of Dodge.24  Meanwhile, on the same date eBay was 
reported as having been cited by thirty-one cases, with only one 
providing negative treatment.25  Furthermore, Professor Robert Rhee 
recently conducted “the first empirical review of judicial discussion of 
shareholder profit maximization in the era of the modern corporation, 
the period 1900‒2016,” and found that “courts have pervasively 
embraced the concept that corporate managers should maximize 
shareholder wealth.”26 
 One source of vigorous pushback on this point is the business 
judgment rule, which allows boards to force plaintiffs to overcome a 
judicially recognized presumption that the board acted in good faith, on 
a fully informed basis, and in the best interests of the corporation.  The 
degree of discretion this grants boards is contested,27 but it seems fair to 
                                                                                                                                            
Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 255, 295 
(2015) (“eBay and Trados . . . are in tension with long-standing doctrine concerning the 
standard of conduct for Delaware directors.”); id. at 292 (citing In re Trados Inc. S'holder 
Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 41 (Del. Ch. 2013)) (“generally it will be the duty of the board, where 
discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of the common 
stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be—to the interests 
created by the special rights, preferences, etc . . . of preferred stock.”).  
24 On file with author. 
25 On file with author.  
26 Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
27 Compare Stephen Bainbridge, Can Tim Cook Ignore ROI When Deciding How to Design an 
iPhone?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 7, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://www. 
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/03/can-tim-cook-ignore-roi-
when-deciding-how-to-design-an-iphone.html (arguing that business judgement rule 
limits courts to following questions: “Did the board commit fraud? Did the board 
commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal?”), with Stephen Bainbridge, Al Franken, 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, and the Business Judgment Rule, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 27, 2010, 4:07 PM), http://www. professorbain-
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/07/shareholder-wealth-maximization-and-
the-business-judgment-rule.html (suggesting failure to advance the best interests of the 
shareholders might constitute bad faith).  It is this author’s belief that brazenly ignoring 
ROI (return on investment) implicates not only good faith, but also the duty of care 
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say that it at least makes it relatively easy for boards to avoid 
accountability for ignoring any duty to maximize shareholder value by 
simply appending a colorable pro-shareholder-value story to any action 
taken.28   
                                                                                                                                            
(which requires a board to assess all material information reasonably available) as well as 
the waste doctrine.  Cf. Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2017) (“Respected judges have downplayed waste as a 
‘vestige’ and described it as ‘possibly non-existent,’ the Loch Ness monster of corporate 
law; but waste survives.”). 
28 Cf. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 
REGENT U.L. REV. 269, 285–86 (2013). 
Judges address only the particular claims and desired 
relief that are brought before them. They cannot and 
do not mandate that governing officials maximize 
shareholder wealth. They can only prohibit them from 
taking particularized actions. In Dodge, the plaintiffs 
sought more dividends. In eBay, the plaintiffs sought 
the nullification of certain anti-takeover measures. 
Neither plaintiff sought an injunction or other remedy 
that would have prohibited directors from pursuing 
the criticized business strategy, and neither the Dodge 
nor the eBay court altered corporate strategy. For 
judges who routinely recite the vaunted business 
judgment rule, moreover, one core rationale for which 
is that directors, not judges, govern corporations, the 
granting of such extraordinary and meddlesome relief 
would seem quite unlikely. Judges may be expressing 
their views about a corporate purpose as they fashion 
remedial relief, but they leave that purpose intact. 
Moreover, the unelected judges in Delaware have 
been, historically speaking, very reluctant to equate 
corporate purpose with stockholder wealth, as the 
turbulent takeover era of the 1980s revealed. In fact, 
only when the demise of the corporation is at hand or 
control over its direction shifts away from dispersed 
shareholders does stockholder wealth become the sole 
purpose. 
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 One case frequently cited in support of the preceding 
proposition is Shlensky v. Wrigley, wherein the Appellate Court of Illinois 
refused to impose liability on the board of the entity that owned the 
Chicago Cubs for failing to install lights so that night games could be 
played even though there was evidence that this caused the team to lose 
money and the rationale for the decision was as contrary to shareholder 
wealth maximization as Ford’s in the Dodge case: 
Plaintiff . . . alleges that defendant Wrigley 
has refused to install lights, not because 
of interest in the welfare of the 
corporation but because of his personal 
opinions “that baseball is a ‘daytime sport’ 
and that the installation of lights and 
night baseball games will have a 
deteriorating effect upon the surrounding 
neighborhood.” It is alleged that he has 
admitted that he is not interested in 
whether the Cubs would benefit 
financially from such action because of 
his concern for the neighborhood . . . .29 
The Shlensky court, however, concluded that “the decision is one 
properly before directors and the motives alleged in the amended 
complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their 
making of that decision.”30  Thus, no liability would be imposed for 
failing to install lights because, “[w]hile all the courts do not insist that 
                                                                                                                                            
Id.  A couple of points are likely worth making here.  First, business strategy arguably 
ultimately only matters in application.  Thus, the fact that judges do not overturn broad 
strategies is cold comfort to boards pondering a particular action.  Second, the fact that 
there exists a unique duty to maximize shareholder value in the context of a change-of-
control does not undermine a claim that a broader duty to maximize shareholder value 
exists as well.  Generally, a board should be able to sacrifice short-term shareholder 
value in exchange for greater long-term shareholder value (in fact, one could argue it is 
obligated to do so), and it is arguably only the option of pursuing such a tradeoff that is 
limited by the change-of-control scenario. 
29 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
30 Id. at 780. 
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one or more of the three elements [of fraud, illegality or conflict of 
interest] must be present for a stockholder's derivative action to lie, 
nevertheless we feel that unless the conduct of the defendants at least 
borders on one of the elements, the courts should not interfere.”31 
 A California Court of Appeal later stated that, “Shlensky 
interpreted Dodge to mean that ‘there must be fraud or a breach of that 
good faith which directors are bound to exercise toward the stockholders 
in order to justify the courts entering into the internal affairs of 
corporations.’”32 However, a few points are worth making here.  First, 
there is at least some reason to believe that Shlensky misinterpreted Dodge.  
The Dodge court ruled that  
[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a 
board of directors to shape and conduct 
the affairs of a corporation for the merely 
incidental benefit of shareholders and for 
the primary purpose of benefiting others, 
and no one will contend that, if the 
avowed purpose of the defendant 
directors was to sacrifice the interests of 
shareholders, it would not be the duty of 
the courts to interfere.33 
This arguably states a much higher bar than limiting review to fraud, 
illegality or conflict of interest.   
Second, the Shlensky court felt the need to provide a shareholder 
wealth maximization motive to support its conclusion: 
[W]e are not satisfied that the motives 
assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and 
                                                            
31 Id.   
32 Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779–80). 
33 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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through him to the other directors, are 
contrary to the best interests of the 
corporation and the stockholders. For 
example, it appears to us that the effect 
on the surrounding neighborhood might 
well be considered by a director who was 
considering the patrons who would or 
would not attend the games if the park 
were in a poor neighborhood. 
Furthermore, the long run interest of the 
corporation in its property value at 
Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to 
keep the neighborhood from 
deteriorating.34 
While this commentary is generally viewed as dicta, the fact that the 
court felt it necessary to provide such a defense for the board at all is 
telling.  
 Finally, a review of the language used by the Shlensky court in its 
opinion reveals the relevant test is at least broader than fraud, illegality or 
conflict of interest.  By way of example, the Shlensky court says both that 
“there must be fraud or a breach of that good faith which directors are bound 
to exercise toward the stockholders,”35 and that “unless the conduct of 
the defendants at least borders on [fraud, illegality or conflict of interest], 
the courts should not interfere.”36  Certainly, an argument can be made, 
in light of all the foregoing, that preferring non-shareholder interests to 
shareholder wealth maximization “borders” on a traditional conflict of 
interest, at least when not supported by a reasonable long-term 
shareholder wealth maximization story.37  
                                                            
34 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. 
35 Id. at 779–80 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 780 (emphasis added). 
37 Cf. Susan Pace Hamill, Untangling the Mystery of Teaching Business Organizations, 59 ST. 
LOUIS U.L.J. 793, 806 n.51 (2015) (“Because Henry Ford may have been trying to 
thwart the Dodge brothers from competing with him when he refused to authorize 
dividends, arguably this [Dodge] decision could have been overturned on the grounds of 
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Another point of contention revolves around what to make of 
courts’ predilection for speaking both in terms of duties “to the 
corporation” as well as duties “to the corporation and its shareholders.”38 
As Professor Heminway notes,39 Vice Chancellor Travis Laster has 
recently explained the distinction as follows: 
[B]y increasing the value of the 
corporation, the directors increase the 
share of value available for the residual 
claimants. Judicial opinions therefore 
often refer to directors owing fiduciary 
duties “to the corporation and its 
shareholders.” This formulation captures 
the foundational relationship in which 
directors owe duties to the corporation 
for the ultimate benefit of the entity's 
residual claimants. Nevertheless, 
“stockholders' best interest must always, 
within legal limits, be the end. Other 
                                                                                                                                            
a conflict of interest.”); Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation As the Adoption of Ends, 
56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 144 (2008). (“In deciding whether the business judgment rule 
applied, the [Shlensky] court was forced to assess Wrigley's motives. Was he out for the 
corporation or was he out for himself? If the latter were the case, Wrigley would have a 
conflict of interest with the shareholders and the business judgment rule would not 
protect him.”). 
38 See Heminway, supra note 6, at, 952–53 (2017) (“Adding to the complexity is some 
doctrinal confusion--or perhaps just a lack of clear expression--in decisional law about 
the institution or constituencies to which or whom director and officer fiduciary duties 
are owed. Some decisional law describes fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and 
other court opinions refer to duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders. 
Although anecdotal observation reveals that the latter cases may predominate more in 
change-of-control settings (where shareholder value primacy plays a more leading role), 
the shareholder beneficiary language also occurs in other settings.”). 
39 See id. at 953. 
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constituencies may be considered only 
instrumentally to advance that end.”40 
 Professor Heminway has noted elsewhere that most frequently, 
“courts find that the duties owed to the corporation operate for the 
primary benefit of shareholders, as the corporation's owners and, more 
specifically, for the financial benefit of shareholders. Yet even this 
formulation is ambiguous, since shareholders are not a monolithic 
group.”41  However, the heterogeneity of shareholders may actually 
support a shareholder wealth maximization norm.  Given expected 
differences in preferences, shareholders should arguably prefer the 
managers of their investments in for-profit corporations to maximize the 
return on those investments, which will then maximize the ability of the 
shareholders to use their newfound wealth for whatever idiosyncratic 
purposes they desire. 
 Professor Robert Rhee has listed some additional arguments 
against a duty to shareholders, at least one that rests on par with, if not 
superior to, a duty to the corporation. 
Courts have frequently commented that “the 
directors owe fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty to the corporation and its 
shareholders.” This formulation implies that 
the duty owed to shareholders ranks pari passu 
with that owed to the corporation. But this is 
not the case. The board's duty to the 
corporation is unwavering and unqualified, but 
its duty to shareholders is not so absolute. For 
example, in takeovers, actual shareholder 
preference is no basis to impose liability if the 
board disagrees with it. In insolvency, the 
                                                            
40 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36–37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99; Leo E. Stine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle 
with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n. 
34 (2012)). 
41 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of Corporate Directors: Following, Walking 
Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59, 74 (2014). 
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board's fiduciary duty is no longer to 
shareholders, but pivots to creditors. When 
shareholders threaten the interest of the 
corporation, the board may take hostile 
actions against them to advance the 
corporation's interest. Ultimately, directors 
owe their fiduciary duty to the corporation as 
a legal entity. Shareholders are one group of 
multiple constituencies, including creditors, 
employees, customers, and suppliers, and by 
virtue of their residual claim they best stand to 
represent the corporation's interest in a 
derivative suit. Thus, we can say that the duty 
running from a director to the shareholder is 
not direct, but flows through the corporation. 
The linearity of the contractual nexus among 
the board, the corporation, and the 
shareholder is important from the standpoint 
of legal duty. A quick review of seminal cases 
in tort law shows that the lack of a direct 
contractual privity precludes the finding of 
duty.42  
 It may be worth addressing these points in turn.  First, Professor 
Rhee states that “in takeovers, actual shareholder preference is no basis 
to impose liability if the board disagrees with it.”  In support of this 
proposition, Professor Rhee cites Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time 
Inc., wherein the court stated the following: “That many, presumably 
most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has 
done does not . . . afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of the 
                                                            
42 Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1139, 1183–84 (2013) (quoting Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)). 
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board's business judgment.”43  However, Time may be better understood 
as empowering the board to pursue long-term shareholder wealth 
maximization even when the shareholders would prefer a transaction 
increasing their wealth in the present.44  This change in perspective 
matters because it upholds, rather than undermines, a duty to 
shareholders.  The duty is not to prioritize their preferences without 
qualification. Rather, the duty is to maximize their wealth.  Thus, rather 
than concluding that the duty to shareholders is weaker than the duty to 
the corporation, we conclude that the duty to shareholders remains 
primary.  Arguably supporting this view, in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. 
v. Airgas, Inc., Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
relied on evidence that “a large number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs 
who bought into Airgas's stock at prices significantly below the $70 offer 
price would be happy to tender their shares at that price regardless of the 
potential long-term value of the company” to justify a board’s defensive 
measures under Time because otherwise the shareholders would “take a 
smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian 
Summer.”45   
                                                            
43 Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc , Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL 
79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).  
44 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and 
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 951 (1988) (“[W]e need some 
anchoring point upon which to rest a theoretical foundation. One approach that others 
have suggested utilizes a hypothetical bargaining game. To do this, one asks: What 
would rational shareholders have agreed upon in a world of low transaction costs? 
What rules would they reach as to self-dealing, permissible takeover defensive tactics, or 
due care liability? My own guess is that the rules they would reach would pretty closely 
approximate the existing law of fiduciary duties with respect to self-dealing, but might 
be quite different with respect to due care liability and takeover defensive tactics.”); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor 
Greenfield, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645, 650 (2002) (“[B]y and large, courts have not 
scrutinized business decisions to see whether directors sacrificed profit maximization to 
advance the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the community. Instead, 
the courts almost invariably accept some rationale as to how the business decisions 
were in the long-range interest of the shareholders.”).  
45 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 111 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“The next 
question is, if a majority of stockholders want to tender into an inadequately priced 
offer, is that substantive coercion? Is that a threat that justifies continued maintenance 
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 Second, Professor Rhee states that in insolvency, “the board's 
fiduciary duty is no longer to shareholders, but pivots to creditors.”46  Of 
course, by definition the shares of an insolvent company should be 
worthless, so directing management to not also leave the corporation’s 
creditors with nothing does not necessarily undercut a shareholder 
wealth maximization duty outside insolvency. 
 Third, we are told that when shareholders “threaten the interest 
of the corporation, the board may take hostile actions against them to 
advance the corporation's interest.”47  The case cited to support this 
proposition is Orban v. Field.48  On this point, it may be worth reviewing 
some relevant commentary from Chancellor Laster in Trados: 
Some scholars have interpreted Orban v. Field, 
1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) 
(Allen, C.), as supporting a “control-
contingent approach” in which a board 
elected by the common stock owes duties to 
the common stockholders but not the 
preferred stock, but a board elected by the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the poison pill? Put differently, is there evidence in the record that Airgas 
stockholders are so ‘focused on the short-term’ that they would ‘take a smaller harvest 
in the swelter of August over a larger one in Indian Summer’?”) (quoting Mercier v. 
Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)). Complicating matters, 
when one takes into account rate of return in addition to stock price, one may find that 
the short-term preference expressed by shareholders in these cases may in fact also be 
maximizing their value in terms of rate of return, even assuming a higher stock price 
later.  This certainly makes more sense from the perspective of rational actor theory, 
but it also weakens the justification for finding the relevant coercion to uphold a 
board’s defensive measures. Nonetheless, this complication is arguably more about 
application of the duty to maximize shareholder value, as opposed to a change in that 
duty. My thanks to Professor Rhee for this insight. 
46 Rhee, supra note 43, at 1183.  
47 Id.  
48 Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997). 
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preferred stock can promote the interests of 
the preferred stock at the expense of the 
common stock. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & 
Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 
990–93 (2006) . . . . The control-contingent 
interpretation does not comport with how I 
understand the role of fiduciary duties or the 
ruling in Orban, which I read as a case in 
which the common stock had no economic 
value such that a transaction in which the 
common stockholders received nothing was 
fair to them.49 
Thus, to the extent the relevant conflict is between shareholder wealth 
maximization and corporate survival in Orban, the preference for 
corporate survival does not necessarily undermine shareholder wealth 
maximization.50 
Finally, Professor Rhee concludes that “[a] quick review of 
seminal cases in tort law shows that the lack of a direct contractual 
privity precludes the finding of duty.”51  However, Proessor Rhee makes 
clear in the beginning of his article that he is not arguing that “a breach 
                                                            
49 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
50 But cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010) (“I believe that the generation of durable wealth for 
its stockholders through fundamentally sound economic activity, such as the sale of 
useful products and services, is the primary goal of the for-profit corporation.”) 
(emphasis added). 
51 Rhee, supra note 43, at 1184.  
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of fiduciary duty is a tort,”52 and lack of a duty under tort law does not 
preclude a fiduciary duty.53  As Professor Salar Ghahramani has noted: 
The breach of these duties – which could 
be caused by conflict of interest or gross 
negligence – is treated as an equitable wrong, 
as opposed to the legal wrongs of tort, 
breach of contract, or the breach of a 
statutory obligation. The distinction matters 
not only because of the different remedial 
regimes that are triggered under law and 
equity, but also because tortious claims, as 
common law civil wrongs, guaranteed a jury 
trial under the unincorporated Seventh 
Amendment, while breach of fiduciary duty 
claims generally carry no such protection 
when invoked as actions in equity.54  
                                                            
52 Id. at 1142 (“To be clear, I do not argue that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort, just 
the way it is not a breach of contract, notwithstanding the contractarian view of 
corporate governance.”). 
53 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. b (1979) (“A fiduciary who 
commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the person 
for whom he should act.”) and Long v. Lowe’s Companies., Inc., No. 6:16–cv–00932–
AA 2017 WL 1217155, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2017) (“[F]iduciary duties ring in tort and 
arise out of common law, regardless of defendants’ corporate form.”) with Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993) (“The tort principles of Barnes have 
no place in a business judgment rule standard of review analysis.”) (citing Barnes v. 
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y.1924)) and MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 
2010 WL 1782271, at *12 n.68 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“Fiduciary duties exist 
independent of tort obligations.”);  see also J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, 
Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71, 71 
(2010) (“We conclude that a breach of a fiduciary duty is in fact a tort, although a 
unique species historically called an ‘equitable tort.’”). 
54 Salar Ghahramani, Professors as Corporate Fiduciaries: Implications for Law, Organizational 
Ethics, and Public Policy, 10 VA. L. & Bus. Rev. 237, 246–47 (2016). 
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Ultimately, the issue here is whether corporate directors are subject to a 
duty to maximize shareholder value and, if so, whether that duty is 
subordinate to a distinct duty to the corporation. Meanwhile, Professor 
Rhee’s goal in the article discussed above is to answer the question: “If 
there was no corporation law of fiduciary duty of care and tort law 
applied instead, what would the legal framework of a director's duty and 
standard of liability look like?”55  Thus, we may at least conclude for now 
that the result of such a thought experiment may well be a diminished 
duty to shareholders, but current law has not reached that conclusion. 
Returning to the general question before us here, it is also worth 
noting that to “economically oriented corporate law professors, 
distinguishing between directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders and a 
duty to the corporation itself smacks of reification – treating the fictional 
corporate entity as if it were a real thing.”56  Reification of the 
corporation is contrary to the popular contractarian view of the firm, and 
the issue implicates corporate personality theory, which will be discussed 
further below.  Suffice it to say for now that while a foolish consistency 
may be the “hobgoblin of little minds,”57 the foregoing at least suggests 
that proponents of shareholder wealth maximization should align 
themselves with associational conceptions of corporate personhood, 
rather than conceptions distinguishing the corporate entity from its 
owners/shareholders.58  In other words, to the extent a duty to the 
                                                            
55 Rhee, supra note 43, at 1142. 
56 Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 879, 895 n.86 (2012). 
57 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841). 
58 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 547–48 (2003) (“[T]he ‘nexus of contracts' or 
‘contractarian’ model . . . denies that shareholders own the corporation. Instead, it 
argues that shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound together 
in a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. Contractarian theory nevertheless 
continues to treat directors and officers as contractual agents of the shareholders, with 
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
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corporation is held out as competing with a duty to shareholders, the 
fictional nature of corporations undermines the claim.59 
Near the end of this section of her paper, Professor Heminway 
concludes that, “[t]o derive a single, broadly applicable norm or rule of 
law on shareholder wealth maximization from these decisions likely 
would be reckless.”60  Furthermore, “it would be over-claiming to assert 
that U.S. state decisional law–any more than U.S. state statutory law–
articulates a clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth maximization 
norm as a matter of substantive corporate doctrine.”61  Yet, in what 
jurisdiction would an attorney advise his or her client to proceed as 
Henry Ford did in the Dodge case?62  Putting aside constituency statutes63 
(and courts that provide shareholder wealth maximization stories for 
defendants before them), I doubt anyone experienced in these matters 
would risk money that mattered to them retrying the Dodge case on 
behalf of Ford.  So long as we define shareholder wealth maximization 
more broadly than short-term shareholder wealth maximization, as I 
believe we should,64 the idea that any practicing lawyer would be 
                                                            
59 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2 (1981) (“In the 
thirteenth century Pope Innocent IV forbade the practice of excommunicating 
corporations on the unassailable logic that, since the corporation had no soul, it could 
not lose one.”). 
60 Heminway, supra note 6, at 954. 
61 Id. at 955. 
62 Cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Is Dodge v Ford Motor Company a Close 
Corporation/Controlling Shareholder Case?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012, 
12:07 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/ 
is-dodge-v-ford-motor-company-a-close-corporationcontrolling-shareholder-case.html 
(“[T]he court’s own analysis in Dodge is not limited to close corporations.”). 
63 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 19 (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization norm may 
survive even in states with nonshareholder constituency statutes.”). 
64 Cf. Tim Hodgson, The Search for a Long-Term Premium, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2017/07/17/the-search-for-a-long-term-premium/ (“Our conclusion is that a sizeable 
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uncertain of the outcome in a case where the board admitted to 
destroying shareholder value in pursuit of some other goal strikes me as 
unlikely.65  Of course, Professor Heminway acknowledges all this, but 
she views it as a “persistent common perception” rather than a rule of 
law.66  I would argue that the perception is so persistent and common 
that it is law.67 
C. Organic Documents 
 Assuming that the default rule of corporate governance is 
shareholder wealth maximization, can parties opt out?  At first blush, it 
                                                                                                                                            
net long-term premium does exist, and we have quantified its size as lying between 
0.5% to 1.5% per annum (pa), depending on an investors’ size and governance 
arrangements.”). But cf., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35–36 (1991) (“[W]hat is the goal of the 
corporation? . . . Our response . . . is: who cares? If the New York Times is formed to 
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second . . . . Those who came in at the 
beginning consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of which 
reflected the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective.”). 
65 Cf. Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the 
Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 875 (2013) (“It is axiomatic 
that directors of a corporation are fiduciaries of its shareholders under federal insider 
trading law . . . .”). 
66 Heminway, supra note 6, at 955–56 (‘“Despite all of the academic debate, the persistent 
common perception seems to be that directorial duties require placing shareholder wealth at 
the forefront. . . .’ [and] it impacts the advice that a lawyer gives to a corporate client 
when the client's board is meeting to engage in decision making or oversight.”) (quoting 
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1,  17–18 (2012)).  
67 Cf. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in 
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 752 (2005) (quoting 
Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive 
Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (2001)) (“Since as early as 
sixteenth-century England, the common law has drawn duties ‘from pre-judicial 
community-defined obligations, based on the accepted coordination norms of the 
community.’”). 
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would seem that a charter provision should be effective,68 but at least 
some have argued that policy considerations may block such plans.   
On the one hand, Professor David Yosifon has noted that: 
The Delaware common law that has 
established shareholder primacy as the 
default governance rule for business 
corporations neither states nor implies any 
public policy indicating that the rule should 
be unalterable by charter provision. Neither 
does there seem to be a clearly implied 
policy of the General Corporation Law to 
prohibit alteration of the shareholder 
primacy rule in firm governance.69 
In addition, as Professor Heminway notes, “corporations have, in the 
past (during the takeover heyday of the mid-1980s), ‘adopted charter 
provisions specifying management's right to consider the interests of 
nonshareholder constituencies.’”70  
 On the other hand, Chancellor Chandler's comments in the eBay 
decision suggest that “there is little room for private ordering around the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm in Delaware corporations that 
attract outside investment.”71  Specifically, Chancellor Chandler noted 
that:  
                                                            
68 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 67, at 36 (“If the New York Times is 
formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be 
allowed to object.  Those who came in at the beginning consented, and those who came 
later bought stock the price of which reflected the corporation’s tempered commitment 
to a profit objective.”). 
69 David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation 
Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 479 (2017). 
70 Heminway, supra note 6, at 958 (quoting Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age 
of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 41 (1987)). 
71 Heminway, supra note 6, at 959. 
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The corporate form . . . is not an 
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic 
ends, at least not when there are other 
stockholders interested in realizing a return 
on their investment. . . . Thus, I cannot 
accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that 
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not 
to maximize the economic value of a for-
profit Delaware corporation for the benefit 
of its stockholders . . . .72   
Of course, “purely philanthropic ends” and shareholder wealth 
maximization aren’t the only two options.  Shareholder wealth 
maximization does not preclude pursuing philanthropic ends,73 and one 
can imagine situations where ignoring philanthropic ends would actually 
preclude maximizing shareholder value.  In addition, Chancellor 
Chandler’s recognition that if the decision-makers in eBay “were the only 
stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be no one to 
object”74 suggests that at least a unanimously adopted charter 
amendment opting out of shareholder wealth maximization would 
succeed.75  Finally, the requirement that a policy must “specifically, 
clearly, and admittedly seek[] not to maximize the economic value of a 
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” in 
                                                            
72 eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34. 
73 Cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 
1986) (“[C]oncern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a 
takeover threat, [provided] that . . . there be some rationally related benefit accruing to 
the stockholders.”); A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 584 (1953) (“In many 
instances [charitable] contributions have been sustained by the courts within the 
common-law doctrine upon liberal findings that the donations tended reasonably to 
promote the corporate objectives.”). 
74 eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34. 
75 Cf. Heminway, supra note 6, at 960 (“Observers may wonder whether these words 
from the Chancellor in and about the eBay opinion can be taken or may be used to 
mean that a Delaware corporation must adopt any corporate policy or initiative that 
contravenes the shareholder wealth maximization norm ab initio or with unanimous 
shareholder approval.”). 
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order to run afoul of the duty to maximize shareholder wealth reminds 
us how rare cases like eBay and Dodge should be, given how relatively easy 
it is to provide a shareholder wealth maximization rationale for most 
corporate actions, which suggests only the most extreme forms of opting 
out of shareholder wealth maximization should fail.  
 Professor Heminway also cites Chief Justice Strine as giving 
“credence to the possibility that a charter provision could successfully 
agree around the shareholder wealth maximization norm,” but “his 
words are less than certain.”76 Specifically, Chief Justice Strine has 
remarked that: “It may well be the case that a certificate of incorporation 
that said that a for-profit corporation would put other constituencies’ 
interests on par with stockholders would, in view of § 101(b) [which 
allows a corporation to pursue any lawful purpose], be respected and 
supersede the corporate common law.”77 
 The openings for opting out of shareholder wealth maximization 
via charter provisions just discussed receive further pushback from those 
who argue that shareholder wealth maximization is a policy of the state, 
at least in Delaware, that trumps otherwise recognized avenues for 
private ordering.  For example, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has noted 
that:  
[S]tate law arguably does not permit 
corporate organic documents to redefine 
the directors' fiduciary duties. In general, 
a charter amendment may not derogate 
from common law rules if doing so 
conflicts with some settled public policy. 
In light of the well-settled shareholder 
wealth maximization policy, nonmonetary 
                                                            
76 Id. at 962. 
77 Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783 (2015). 
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factors charter amendments therefore 
appear vulnerable.78 
Professor Heminway notes that policy considerations created sufficient 
judicial hostility to private ordering around board management that it 
required legislative action to validate shareholder agreements to that 
end,79 and in this case the legislative response may already have been 
issued in the form of benefit corporations.80 
 It is worth repeating here that at least some of the shareholder 
wealth implications of benefit corporations may be over-stated.  For 
example, Professor Heminway quotes a student note wherein it is 
claimed that: 
States, by creating benefit corporations, . . 
. are . . . unnecessarily reinforcing current 
beliefs by establishing a dichotomy in 
which there are only two entities: (1) 
regular corporations, which cannot take 
into consideration social factors and must 
maximize shareholder wealth; and (2) 
                                                            
78 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 
971, 985 (1992);  cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 575–77 (2003) (“[S]hareholder wealth 
maximization is not only the law, but also is a basic feature of corporate ideology.”).  
79 Heminway, supra note 6, at 960–61, at (“A hostile judicial reaction of this kind to 
corporate private ordering is reminiscent of the judicial reception to shareholder 
agreements before statutes expressly validated them as a means of agreeing around the 
directors' managerial authority over the corporation.”). 
80 See id. at 963–64 (“Two additional factors provide a cause for pause in endorsing the 
validity of charter-based private ordering relating to the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. The first is the State of California's repeated rejection of a 
corporate charter provision that included a social purpose clause …. The second 
additional factor that may affect the validity of charter-based private ordering that is 
determined to be inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is the 
legislative adoption of benefit corporations and other statutory forms of social 
enterprise entity.”); cf. id. at 964 (“The only saving grace, although perhaps it provides 
little comfort, is that benefit corporation statutes typically include a provision 
disclaiming any effect of benefit corporation statutes on the validity or interpretation of 
the for-profit corporate law outside the benefit corporation context.”). 
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benefit corporations, which can take into 
consideration social factors and do not 
have to maximize shareholder wealth.81  
However, it is incorrect to say that “regular corporations … cannot take 
into consideration social factors” because social factors impact the 
shareholder wealth analysis, and not always negatively.  In fact, in 
determining the best path to maximizing shareholder value, corporations 
arguably must consider social factors in order to satisfy their duty of care 
to become informed of all material information reasonably available.  
The only thing a for-profit corporation cannot do in a shareholder 
wealth maximization regime is knowingly sacrifice shareholder value, 
whether calculated in the short- or long-term, in pursuit of some social 
end. 
 Professor Heminway concludes that “[t]he accumulated evidence 
is at best unclear about whether a public or private firm incorporated in 
or outside Delaware can engage in private ordering in its charter to 
include a corporate purpose that may be interpreted in a manner 
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm.”82  
Furthermore, “[g]iven this uncertainty about charter-based private 
ordering, prospects for the validity and enforceability of corporate 
bylaws, shareholder agreements, and board policies also may be in 
doubt.”83  Thus, the debate continues, and this opens the door for 
corporate personality theory to play a role. 
                                                            
81 Id. (quoting Jessica Chu, Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth 
of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 185–86 (2012)). 
82 Id. at 966. 
83 Id. at 967; cf Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate 
“Contracts”, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sep. 11, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/11/forum-selection-provisions-in-
corporate-contracts/ (“Treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms as a matter 
of ordinary contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified. While there is a family 
resemblance, a corporation’s charter and bylaws are no ordinary contracts. Rather, they 
are hybrid legal structures that provide a mechanism for collective choice in the context 
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III. CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY 
Corporate personhood addresses when corporations should be 
treated as persons under applicable law.  Assuming corporate 
personhood, corporate personality theory addresses what type of person 
the corporation should be treated as.  The traditional theories of 
corporate personality are: (1) artificial entity or concession theory, (2) 
aggregate or contractarian theory, and (3) real entity theory.84  Professor 
Eric Chaffee has recently argued for a fourth theory: collaboration 
theory.  According to Professor Chaffee, collaboration theory is “a new 
theory of the corporation that . . . mandates that corporations engage in 
socially responsible behavior.”85  The following sub-parts will explain the 
differences between these four theories, as well as examine the argument 
that corporate personality theories are too indeterminate to form the 
basis for legal analysis.  This will lay the foundation for exploring how 
corporate personality theory may inform the debate about the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, as well as attempts to opt out of 
the norm via private ordering. 
A. Artificial Entity / Concession Theory 
 Artificial entity theory (also known as concession theory) is 
typically associated with the famous description of corporations 
delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1819 case of Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward: 
A corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it, either expressly, 
or as incidental to its very existence. 
                                                                                                                                            
of substantial state regulation and straddle the public-private divide in ways that make 
them quite dissimilar from ordinary contracts.”). 
84 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformation of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 (2005). 
85 Chaffee, supra note 10, at 357.  
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These are such as are supposed best 
calculated to effect the object for which it 
was created . . . . The objects for which a 
corporation is created are universally such 
as the government wishes to promote. 
They are deemed beneficial to the 
country; and this benefit constitutes the 
consideration, and in most cases, the sole 
consideration of the grant.86 
As can be surmised from the foregoing, concession theory tends to take 
a broad view of the government’s ability to regulate corporations, and 
views the corporation as standing more on the public, rather than 
private, side of citizen/state divide – at least as compared to other 
theories of the corporation.87 
B. Aggregate / Contractarian Theory 
 As I have written elsewhere, “[t]he aggregate view rejected the 
fiction of the corporation as an artificial entity, which had been 
promoted by concession theory, and instead focused on the property 
rights of the underlying shareholders to conceive of the corporation as 
simply an association of individuals.”88  It places the corporation squarely 
on the private side of the citizen/state divide, and supports granting 
corporations many of the same rights to resist government regulation as 
natural persons.  The aggregate view is typically associated with the 
                                                            
86 Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819). 
87 See generally Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 
342–43 (2014) (addressing “four arguments frequently advanced to undermine 
concession theory,” and arguing that “none of these arguments creates an 
insurmountable obstacle for the application of concession theory”). 
88 Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the Death of the 
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 374 (2017). 
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modern nexus-of-contracts (or contractarian) view of the firm.89  
However, by viewing the corporation as nothing more than an 
association of individuals, aggregate theory risks undermining the 
theoretical justification for granting shareholders limited liability when it 
comes to the debts of the corporation.  Real entity theory, which is 
discussed next, may be viewed as a solution to this problem.  
                                                            
89 See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819–22 (1999) (describing 
the history and limitations of the nexus of contracts conception): 
In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling first 
formulated the conception that the corporation is 
a nexus of contracts . . . . Since that time, the 
conception has dominated the law-and-economics 
literature in corporate law . . . . [T]he intellectual 
history of . . . Jensen and Meckling . . . begins with 
Ronald Coase[] . . . [who] characterized the 
boundaries of the firm as the range of exchanges 
over which the market system was superseded and 
resource allocation was accomplished instead by 
authority and direction . . . . Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz objected to the Coasian 
conception of the firm, and emphasized instead 
the role of team production within the firm and 
the role of agreement and monitoring in team 
production . . . . Jensen and Meckling applauded 
Alchian and Demsetz's objection to Coase's 
theory of the firm, but concluded that Alchian and 
Demsetz had not gone far enough in rejecting 
Coase . . . . [Jensen and Meckling] therefore 
substituted, for Coase's conception of the firm, 
the competing conception that the firm was a 
nexus of contracts--and, more particularly, “that 
most organizations are simply legal fictions which 
serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals . . . .” 
(internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
310 (1976) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Armen 
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972))). 
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C. Real / Natural Entity Theory 
 By positing a “real” (as opposed to artificial), non-governmental 
entity standing between shareholders and the state, real entity theory can 
be understood as a solution to the problem of possibly undermining 
limited liability with aggregate theory, while still providing a strong 
bulwark against regulation.90 Professor Chaffee notes: 
The work of German legal theorist Otto 
von Gierke played a key role in the 
development of real entity theory. Gierke 
posited that groups have a “collective 
spirit” that gives them an identity separate 
and apart from the individuals composing 
them. Therefore, according to Gierke, 
when individuals unite, including to 
organize, operate, and own corporations, 
a real entity is created that is independent 
and distinct.91 
If collective spirits seem a bit too nebulous for a theory of corporations, 
one might also consider the board of directors as constituting the real 
entity,92 similar to how the shareholders constitute the aggregate in at 
least some versions of contractarian theory.93 
                                                            
90 Cf. John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old 
Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 823 (1989) (“[T]he natural entity theory developed as 
certain aspects of corporate practice began to bring into question the adequacy of the 
aggregate theory, which had dominated the law during the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century.”); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 221 (1985) (“The main effect of the natural entity theory of the 
business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise and to destroy any special 
basis for state regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation by the 
state.”). 
91 Chaffee, supra note 10, at 365. 
92  Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003) (“[T]o the limited extent to which the corporation is 
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D. Collaboration Theory 
 Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory views the corporation as 
similar to a joint venture or partnership to the extent that “the state and 
the individuals organizing, operating, and owning a corporation are 
collaborating within the corporate form, i.e., they are ‘[j]oint adventurers’ 
within the contractual relationship that generates the corporation.”94  
This characterization differentiates collaboration theory by imposing a 
requirement that corporations seek pro-social ends whenever the 
expected value of a transaction is unknowable or the contemplated pro-
social action is shareholder wealth neutral.95  This is necessary to fulfill 
the obligation of good faith imposed on joint-venturers.96   
 From the perspective of those seeking to advance the cause of 
corporate social responsibility, collaboration theory may offer the best 
                                                                                                                                            
properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of directors that personifies the 
corporate entity.”). 
93 Of course, identifying the board with the real entity of the corporation creates 
potential problems from a governance perspective to the extent a duty corporation 
becomes a board’s duty to itself. 
94  Chaffee, supra note 10, at 374. 
95Id. at 376 (“[B]eyond engaging in socially responsible behavior when it supports profit 
maximization, those organizing, operating, and owning corporations should engage in 
such behavior in two additional circumstances to fulfill their implied duty of good faith. 
First, in instances in which the socially responsible behavior neither financially benefits 
nor financially harms the corporation, which means it is cost neutral, the corporation 
should engage in socially responsible behavior to fulfill the implied duty of good faith 
within the collaboration. Second, in instances in which the financial benefit to the 
business entity is uncertain, the corporation should engage in socially responsible 
behavior to fulfill the implied duty of good faith within the collaboration.”). 
96 Id. at 375–76. (“[I]ndividuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation are 
required to treat the state government well, i.e., with good faith, because these parties 
have agreed to collaborate. Exploring what ‘treating the state government well’ means, 
in a democracy, the government is supposed to represent the will of the people, which 
can be interpreted as the will of society because society is the aggregate of the people. 
Although debatable, one can assume that society wants to be treated in a way that 
supports its well-being, i.e., in a way that is socially responsible. Thus, when not seeking 
profit maximization, those organizing, operating, and owning corporations should 
engage in socially responsible behavior.”). 
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hope when it comes to theories of corporate personhood.  This is 
because, while the social responsibility of the corporation depends on the 
predilections of the owners, board, or state under aggregate, real entity, 
or concession theory respectively, collaboration theory has social 
responsibility built into its framework. 
E. Indeterminacy 
 In 1926, John Dewey published The Historic Background of Corporate 
Legal Personality, wherein he sought to show that “[e]ach theory has been 
used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing 
ends.”97  His critique was so powerful that “[m]any commentators view 
John Dewey's 1926 Yale Law Journal article as having put an end to the 
corporate personhood debate.”98  However, the emergence of the nexus-
of-contracts theory of the firm, along with cases like Citizens United and 
Hobby Lobby, have left us with an extremely invigorated corporate 
personhood debate.  Professor Chaffee identifies three reasons for 
rejecting Dewey’s call to ignore corporate personality theory: 
First, avoiding complexity should not 
justify failing to seek knowledge . . . . 
Second, understanding the essential 
nature of corporations has become 
important because it impacts how these 
                                                            
97 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669 
(1926). 
98 Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1650 
(2011).  But see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 106 (1992) (“[J]ohn Dewey...could not, 
I believe, have demonstrated successfully that each theory of corporate personality 
could have equally legitimated the practices of emergent large-scale business 
enterprise.”); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 135 (2007) (“[A]lthough theories [of the 
corporation] are not determinative, from time to time and in place to place, they tend to 
have certain specific associations.”).  
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business entities can and should interact 
with society. As the Supreme Court of the 
United States' recent opinions in cases 
such as Citizens United and Hobby Lobby 
evidence, understanding the essential 
nature of the corporation has never been 
more important . . . . Without 
understanding the nature of the corporate 
form, understanding the rights of a 
corporation and how it should be 
regulated is impossible. Third, a better 
essential theory of the corporation is 
possible.99  
IV. CORPORATE PERSONALITY THEORY & SHAREHOLDER 
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
 Professor Heminway notes that, “[w]hile corporate law statutory 
rules may, in fact, also represent or codify norms, decisional law often 
relies on theory and policy to fill gaps in meaning.”100  Therefore,  
“theory and policy may ‘push’ the law in individual settings one way or 
another when the issue is perceived to be one of first impression or 
otherwise creates legal uncertainty.”101  This at least suggests a role for 
corporate personality theory in resolving the issue of whether 
corporations may opt out of the duty to maximize shareholder value. 
While the bulk of this Essay has been devoted to examining the 
foundations of the claim that private ordering to opt out of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate law is both 
necessary and risky, it is hoped that the following brief suggestions 
regarding ways forward can spur further inquiry and creative problem 
solving. 
                                                            
99 Chaffee, supra note 10, at 370–71. 
100 Heminway, supra note 6, at 941. 
101 Id. 
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 Assuming shareholder wealth maximization is required by law, 
which corporate personality theory best supports opting out via private 
ordering?  If one assumes that private citizens are granted the most 
liberty vis-à-vis the state, then the aggregate and real entity theories 
should provide more support for private ordering, since they align the 
corporation more with private citizens than concession theory.102  
Collaboration theory is arguably more state-focused than aggregate or 
real entity theory, though less than concession theory.  Thus, 
characterizing the corporation as an association of individuals, be that in 
the form of the shareholders or the board, should be more likely to 
support private ordering. However, context matters, and thus, for 
example, collaboration theory might be more supportive of opting out of 
shareholder wealth maximization due to its fundamental support of 
corporate social responsibility. 
 Of course, the protestations of the indeterminacy advocates have 
weight, and one should carefully consider the particular facts of each 
situation before choosing the best theory of corporate personality to rely 
on in making one’s case.  However, anyone in doubt of the power of 
corporate personality theory in cases like this would do well to read, or 
re-read, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United.  I am not 
alone in having argued that corporate personality theory had a major role 
to play in the disposition of that case.103  Imagine showing up to argue 
                                                            
102 Cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to 
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–10, 64 (1990) (discussing the concession 
theory and presumption in favor of regulation). 
103 See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 9, at 833–34 (2013) (arguing that a close reading of 
Citizens United “reveals that both the majority and dissent not only adopted diverging 
theories of the corporation, but that those theories were likely dispositive,” and that 
corporate personality theory “played the same silent and dispositive role” in many of 
the cases leading up to Citizens United); Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: 
Stevens' Pernicious Version of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 
2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom 
/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-
theory.html; cf. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Hobby Lobby, BUS. L. 
PROF BLOG (Jul. 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07 
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that case having dismissed any role for corporate personality theory as 
too indeterminate, only to find the justices engaging in a heated debate 
about whether the corporation is better treated as a mere association of 
citizens or creature of the state, along with opposing counsel ready to 
defend his or her preferred view of the firm.104  One ignores corporate 
personality theory in such cases at one’s own risk. 
 As an alternative to opting out of shareholder wealth 
maximization, proponents of socially responsible corporate behavior 
may leverage Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory to emphasize, 
perhaps by way of corporate charter or bylaw, that socially responsible 
corporate behavior should only be found to violate the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm when it clearly undermines shareholder 
wealth.  In all other situations, including where the corporate socially 
responsible behavior is shareholder wealth enhancing, neutral, or has an 
uncertain impact on shareholder wealth, a board may pursue the socially 
responsible behavior without violating its obligation to maximize 
shareholder value, and may even pre-commit to pursuing socially 
responsible behavior in all these cases.105  Thus, in both these situations 
                                                                                                                                            
/the-role-of-corporate-personality-theory-in-hobby-lobby.html (noting that while 
Justice Alito's majority opinion equated the closely held corporation with its controlling 
shareholders, and thus granted the corporation standing to claim interference with its 
free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the corporation could not, 
as an artificial entity, exercise religion).  
104 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 33, 81, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 876 
(2010), SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment_transcripts/2008/08-205[Reargued].pdf (“JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . what 
you are suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons, gave birth to 
corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that that was the Court's 
error to start with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court imbued a 
creature of State law with human characteristics”; “JUSTICE BREYER: Actually I read 
that sentence that you just read as meaning the corporation is an artificial person in 
respect to which the State creates many abilities and capacities, and the State is free also 
to create some disabilities and capacities.”; JUSTICE STEVENS: But if there is a 
compelling government -- can there be any case in which there is a different treatment 
of corporations and individuals in your judgment?”). 
105 I am not aware of any charter or bylaw provision setting forth such a commitment.  
A October 1, 2017 Westlaw search of “EDGAR Articles of Incorporation & Bylaws” 
for ("socially responsible" OR "social responsibility") in 10-Ks of Delaware 
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corporate personality theory has a role to play in determining the scope 
of socially responsible behavior available to corporations.106 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have hopefully advanced the scholarship of both 
Professors Joan Heminway and Eric Chaffee by demonstrating that the 
recent shareholder wealth maximization analysis of Professor Heminway 
can be viewed through the lens of Professor Chaffee’s recent work on 
corporate personality theory in a way that can provide direction to 
counsel dealing with issues of corporate wealth maximization and the 
limits on corporate social responsibility imposed thereby.  I conclude 
that corporate personality theory can be useful both in debates about the 
viability of opting out of shareholder wealth maximization, as well as in 
providing a framework for maximizing the ability of corporations to 
engage in socially responsible behavior within the shareholder wealth 
maximization framework.107 
                                                                                                                                            
corporations with market caps of $5 million or more returned seven documents, all of 
which referenced the relevant text in connection with a Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee (or similar body) under the bylaws.  Of course, this was an extremely 
limited search, and further efforts may be more fruitful. 
106 Cf. How Two Rulings Are Removing Roadblocks from Impact Investing, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb. 18, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn. 
edu/article/how-two-federal-rulings-are-removing-the-roadblocks-from-impact-
investing/ (“new guidance . . . reaffirms that private pension plans . . . can take social 
factors into account as long as returns are not compromised . . . . [F]iduciaries may take 
social impact into account as ‘tie-breakers’ when investments are otherwise equal.”). 
107 Cf. John Rapley, How Economics Can Free Itself from Religious Dogmatism, EVONOMICS 
(July 13, 2017), http://evonomics.com/economics-religion-dogmaticism- rapley/ 
(“Narratives will remain an inescapable part of the human sciences for the simple 
reason that they are inescapable for humans.”). 
